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CASENOTE

Of Courts, Clauses and Native American
Culture: Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association
[Plolicy, numbers, and skill, prevailed. As the white population
advanced, that of the [American] Indians necessarily receded.'
-Chief
I.

Justice John Marshall

INTRODUCTION

In April of 1988, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
construction of a six mile road through government lands held sacred
by three American Indian tribes, did not burden the respondents'
religion, and was thus not subject to strict scrutiny under the first
amendment's free exercise clause. 2 Writing for the majority3 in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation,4 Justice O'Connor reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals whJih had reasoned
that a compelling government interest was required to allow construction of the Forest Service road.5 Having found no such interest of a
magnitude to overcome respondents' rights, the lower court had
permanently enjoined the road's completion. 6
Respondents, various Indian Nations of the Hoopa Valley reservation in the Siskiyou Mountains of Northwest California, sought an
1. Johnson v. M'intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).

2. U.S. CONST. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . ."
added).
3. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S.
1321 (1988). Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration of the 5-3
4. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
5. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. v. Peterson, 795
695 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
6. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F.
(N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part Northwest Indian Cemetery !rotective

(emphasis

Ct. 1319,
ruling.
F.2d 688,
Protective
Supp. 566
Ass'n v.

Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 698 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest

Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
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injunction against the proposed roadway on constitutional grounds as
early as 1982.1 The Chimney Rock area of the adjoining Six Rivers

National Forest has been historically critical to the religious practice
of the Indians' culture. 8 Indeed, quoting from a study commissioned
by the National Forest Service, 9 the Supreme Court acknowledged

that allowing the road's completion, "would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an integral and necessary
part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian

peoples." 0
This note will examine the decision in Lyng: its precedent and
policy. Included in Part II is an overview of those landmark rulings
which have shaped the analysis of constitutional law in the area of
free exercise arguments. Following a report of the Lyng history and
decision, Part III will briefly examine the holding in light of a broader
and more recent trend, which distances the Supreme Court from the
strict review of religious exercise claims.
II.

BACKGROUND

For nearly a century following the ratification of the Bill of
Rights" the Supreme Court said remarkably little on the substantive
content of the religion clauses of the first amendment. Once called
upon to rule however, the Court has struggled in defining the scope
of the free exercise clause. 12 To what extent government regulations
7. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951
(N.D. Cal. 1982). For a discussion of cases involving American Indians' exercise of
religioius beliefs, see Note, Native Americans and the Free Exercise Clause, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 1509 (1977).
8. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1322. It is true that culture in the abstract, and apart
from any specific religious contribution, has been held not protected by the first
amendment. Refusing Cherokee claims to land in Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) the
court wrote, "[t]he overwhelming concern of the affiants appears to be related to
the historical beginnings of the Cherokees and their cultural development. It is
damage to tribal and family folklore and traditions, more than particular religious
observances, which appears to be at stake."
9. D. THEODORATUS, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock Section, Gasquet-Orleans Road, Six Rivers National Forest (1979), (Hereinafter THEoDORATUs
REPORT).

10.,Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1322 (1988) (citing THEODORATUS REPORT supra note 9).
11. The first ten amendments (Bill of Rights) as approved became effective
December 15, 1791.
12. At least one constitutional scholar has suggested that the Supreme Court's
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may impede personal conduct as an extension of religious belief, has

been the traditional constitutional question. 3
One of the Court's
exercise clause involved
1879 case of Reynolds
upheld the validity of a

earliest doctrinal interpretations of the free
a ruling adverse to Mormon practice in the
v. United States.14 In Reynolds, the Court
federal statute prohibiting polygamy despite

the appellant's religious justification. The government argued from

its interest in preserving monogamous marriages, 5 and from a position
of protecting the helpless and unsuspecting female. 6 The Court's
decision agreed with the government, drawing a distinction between
the appellant's unfettered right to personal beliefs, and Congressional
ability to regulate acts. 17 Although this general distinction in the area
of right to worship remains, it has been greatly modified.
Some sixty years later, the conviction of three Jehoah Witnesses

for soliciting religious contributions without a license was overturned

in Cantwell v. Connecticut.8 The ruling of Cantwell contributed to
first amendment analysis in two significant respects. First, the interests
protected by the government through criminal statutes, to the extent
such statutes might clash with sincerely motivated religious activity,
would henceforth be required to be achieved by the least restrictive
means. 19 Second, as Newton Cantwell and his two sons had been

ad hocism, in deciding religious controversies, is due in part to the Court's fundamental misinterpretation of the intentions of the first amendment's authors. See M.
MAumJn, RELIGION, LIBERTY, AND LAW IN THE AmERicAN FOUNDING (198I); M.

MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST

AMENDMENT (1978).
13. See infra notes 14-36 and accompanying text.
14. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). As the foundational case of free exercise clause analysis,
Reynolds is still criticized by scholars. See Smith, Getting Off On the Wrong Foot
and Back On Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson
Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 569 (1984). See also L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN
CONSTrrIUTIONAL LAW § 14-13, at 1271 (1988) (suggesting that Reynolds' holding was
the result of Mormon persecution).
15. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
16. Id. at 168.
17. Id. at 164. "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order." Id.
18. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Both free exercise and free speech rights were at issue
in Cantwell.
19. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
[W]e think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and
punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a
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convicted under Connecticut law, the Supreme Court's decision made
first amendment religious guarantees applicable to state legislation
through the ambit of the fourteenth amendment.20
In its reasoning the Court reiterated the belief/action dichotomy
expressed in Reynolds.2' However, the opinion went on to declare
that while freedom to act in accordance with one's faith cannot be
absolute, the free exercise clause does protect activities themselves. 22
Further, any government "power to regulate must be so exercised as
not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected

freedom. "23

At the heart of both Reynolds and Cantwell, were burdens of
criminal penalty; threats of sentencing which prohibited religious
exercise were at issue. It was for 1963 and the case of Adell Sherbert,
to broaden the Court's perspective.2 Sherbert, a South Carolinian
and Seventh-Day Adventist, was fired by her employer because she
25
refused to work Saturdays according to the dictates of her faith.
South Carolina subsequently, in conjunction with its Unemployment
Compensation Act, 26 denied Sherbert benefits because she refused
suitable employment without good cause. 27 Sherbert sued, arguing
that the state's scheme acted to prohibit her religion in violation of
the first amendment.
The Court held that if the effect of a law is discrimination
between faiths, "even though the burden may be characterized as...
only indirect," ' 2 that law is unconstitutional as a prohibition of
religion. The religious bias of South Carolina's compensatory plan
substantial interest of the State, the petitioner's communication, considered
in the light of the constitutional guaranties, raised no such ...

menace...

as to render him liable to conviction ....
Id. at 311.
20. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 reads in pertinent part, "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges ... of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of ... liberty ...

without due

process of law."
21. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
22. Id. at 303-04. "Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to
believe and freedom to act.... The freedom to act must have appropriate definition
to preserve the enforcement of that protection." Id.
23. Id. at 304.
24. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
25. Id. at 399.

S.C.

26. As then existing, S.C. CODE, Trr. § 68-114(3) (1962) (current version at
§ 14-35-120 (Law. Co-op 1986)).
27. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
28. Id. at 404 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).

CODE ANN.
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was that the state clearly reserved the right of adherents of other
faiths to refuse Sunday work, without similar effects to unemployment
benefits. 29 However, it was the recognition of an incidental burden on
the exercise of religious belief, coupled with the suggestion in dicta
of strict scrutiny of state interests that lends importance to Sherbert.
Other than the possibility of fraud, South Carolina could cite no
compelling reason to deny appellant Sherbert's unemployment benefits. 30 Reminiscent of the language in Cantwell, the Court reasoned
that even if such a state concern was found to be paramount, "it
would plainly be incumbent upon ... [South Carolina] to demonstrate
that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses
without infringing First Amendment rights. ' ' 3' In so holding, the
Court expressly rejected the possibility that its decision conflicted with
the establishment clause. 32 Rather, the opinion stated that neutral
' 33
responses to religious differences are a "governmental obligation.
Strict scrutiny of government's interference with the exercise of
religions was further solidified in the case of an Amish family who
sought exemption from compulsory public education for their children
beyond the eighth grade. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 4 the Court struck
down a state mandatory school attendance law. Although a criminal
penalty was involved for noncompliance with the state statute, the
Court's analysis relied heavily on the finding that Amish culture as
an entity was unduly burdened. An expert on Amish lifestyle had
testified that requiring Amish children to attend public high schools,
with its unavoidable exposure to the modern values of American
society, would "result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish...
community as it exists ... today." ' 3 In weighing the needs of state
education against the burden to Amish religious practice the Court-

Id.

29. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
30. Id. at 407.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 409.
33. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409.
In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the "establishment" of
the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of
unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers
reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the
face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of
religious with secular institutions, which it is the object of the Establishment
Clause to forestall.
34. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

35. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
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citing Sherbert-reaffirmedthat only those "interests of the highest
order . . . not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to

the free exercise of religion." '3 6
Such was the constitutional setting for the claims of the Yurok,
Karok, and Tolowa Indian tribes who pressed suit for the free exercise
of their religious beliefs in Lyng; beliefs and spiritual practices of the
Native Americans that predate the first amendment itself."7
III.

A.

LYNG v. NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY PROTECTIVE
ASSOCIATION

HISTORY OF THE CASE

Central to the controversy in Lyng is the site-specific nature of
the Native American mode of worship. 8 Belief in individual salvation
through omniscient deities as defined in Western theology, play no
part in the respondents' faith.39 Rather, it is meditation and religious
ceremonial dances as part of an underlying World Renewal ° effort
that are crucial to practice and indispensable to tribal existence itself. 41
The "high country", the holy land of the Yurok, Karok, and
Tolowa tribes, is encompassed by the Blue Creek Unit42 within the

boundaries of California's Six Rivers National Forest. Although the
Indians consider the entire region to be sacred land, the highest
mountain peaks are of particular importance. These include Chimney
Rock, Doctor Rock, and Peak 8.41 Preparatory to such religious and

36. Id. at 215.
37. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1330 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. For discussions of Native American worship and public land use, see
generally Note, American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conventional Analysis in an Unconventional Setting, 85 MicH. L. REv. 771
(1987); Note, Native Americans' Access to Religious Sites: Underprotected Under the
Free Exercise Clause?, 26 B.C.L. REv. 463 (1985); Note, Indian Religious Freedom
and Government Development of Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447 (1984); Note,
Indian Worship v. Government Development: A New Breed of Religious Cases, 84
UTAH L. Rev. 313 (1984).
39. Lyng, 108 S.Ct. at 1331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. For an anthropological examination of respondents' religious tradition, see
A. KROEBER & E. GIFFORD, WORLD RENEWAL: A CULT SYSTEM OF NATIVE NORTHWEST
CALIFORNIA (1949).

41. Lyng, 108 S.Ct. at 1331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
586, 591 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub
nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
43. Id.
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medicinal ceremonies as the White Deerskin, Jump, Brush, and Kick
Dances, pilgrimage by participants to the sacred areas is required."
Respondents' beliefs necessitate visits to the sites, as prehuman spirits
inhabited the region upon man's arrival on earth. 45 Communication
with these spirits, considered by the Indians to be the very source of
their religious powers," is "facilitated by certain qualities of the
physical environment, the most important of which are privacy,
silence, and an undisturbed natural setting." '47 The Indians maintained
that intrusions into the "high country" would destroy those very
qualities required for successful religious practice.4 8 As Chimney Rock

and the other peaks command a view of the surrounding wilderness,

interfere with the Indians'
visual and audible disruptions would
"spiritual exchange with the creator. ' 49
Prior to the Indians' litigation in the courts below, Congress had
passed a joint resolution concerning Native American worship. The
American Indian Religious Freedom Act50 (AIRFA), ostensibly protected respondents' traditional use of the sites in question,5 ' and the
tribes hoped this legislation would help preserve the "high country"
so crucial to their culture.
The problem in Lyng stemmed from a Forest Service management
plan initiated in 1972; a 6.02 mile road traversing the Chimney Rock
44. Id. at 591-92.
45. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1332 (1988) (quoting THEODORATUS REPORT, at 181).
48. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
586, 592 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub
nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
49. Id. at 591.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982).
51. The Resolution states:
On or after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United States to
protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right to freedom
to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American
Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to
access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to
worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.

Id.

For analysis of AIRFA's impact on Native America, see generally, Note, The
First Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act: An Approach to
Protecting Native American Religion, 71 IowA L. REv. 869 (1986); Note, The
American Indian Religious Freedom Act-An Answer to the Indian's Prayers?, 29
S.D.L. REv. 131 (1983); Note, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 25
ARiz. L. REv. 429 (1983).
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area of the Blue Creek Unit linking Gasquet and Orleans, California
(G-O Road), was proposed.5 2 The G-O Road's planned route not only
crossed respondents' holy lands, it separated one of the three specific
sites central to the region's religious significance from the other two."
The Forest Service considered the G-0 Road necessary to improve
logging capabilities within the Blue Creek Unit and to bolster employment prospects for the area's timber industry.5 4 Pursuant to the
overall plan, some 733 million board feet of timber was to be logged
from the Blue Creek Unit over a period of eighty years. 5 Benefits
expected from the road construction included improved administration
of the Six Rivers National Forest itself, additional recreational use of
the Blue Creek Unit in particular, and increased profits from future
timber sales.16 Following heated objection by local tribes and various
environmental organizations, the final draft of the Forest Service's
scheme allowed for half-mile to one-eighth mile "protective zones"
surrounding respondents' sacred sites and their traditional routes of
access.' 7 Within these zones, timber harvesting or road construction
was prohibited. 8 Notwithstanding such accommodation, the Forest
Service's own study concluded that completion of the G-O Road
through any portion of the Chimney Rock area would produce
irreparable damage to the Indian communities' culture and ultimately
advised against the road construction.' 9
Having failed in efforts for administrative relief, respondents 60
brought suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against
52. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688,
690 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
53. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.

586, 592 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub

nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).

54. Id. at 595.
55. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 690, rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian

Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).

56. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 595, aff'd in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986),

rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct.
1319 (1988).
57. Id. at 592.
58. Id.
59. THEODORATUS REPORT, supra note 9, at 422.

60. Respondents Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, plaintiffs in the
actions below, are five non-profit organizations (Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, The Wilderness Society, Sierra Club, California Trout and Northcoast Environmental Center), and two unincorporated associations (Redwood Region
Audubon Society and Siskiyou Mountains Resource Council), six individual plaintiffs,
and the State of California. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 590.
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construction of the planned roadway. Their claims challenged the
proposed route as being violative of the first amendment of the
Constitution, contrary to AIRFA, and prohibited by numerous federal

environmental statutes. 6' The district court rejected the argument that
AIRFA established an express cause of action, 62 but both the lower

court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in favor of the
Indians' constitutional claim. 63 The appellate court further ruled that
passage of the California Wilderness Act of 198464 had rendered
certain of respondents' statutory challenges moot. 65 That enactment
61. The Forest Service road was additionally challenged in the action under:
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.;
and the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq.; the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.; [and the
government's trust responsibility toward] water and fishing rights [of the
members of] the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation... ; the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 ... the Multiple Use Sustained-Yield
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 528-531; and the National Forest Management Act of
1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq.
(numbering omitted) Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795
F.2d 688, 690 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
62. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
586, 597 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub
nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
63. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 691-92
(9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988). "The first amendment prohibits governmental actions that
burden an individual's free exercise of religion unless those actions are necessary to
fulfill a governmental interest of the highest order that cannot be met in a less
restrictive manner." Id. at 691; "We agree with the district court that the proposed
operations would interfere with the Indian plaintiffs' free exercise rights." Id. at 692;
"In our view, the government has fallen short of demonstrating the compelling
interest required to justify its proposed interference. . . ." Id. at 695.
The court of appeals, in further support of its opinion, addressed the issue of
any potential conflict between first amendment clauses. It held: "[tihe Forest Service
would not, by virtue of this injunction, sponsor or become entangled in religious
matters in violation of the establishment clause. Nor is the Forest Service being
required to police the conduct of visitors to prevent their interfering with Indian
religious observances. . . ." Id. at 694. Although the Supreme Court in Lyng did not
examine the preceding possibility, in light of the Court's holding in McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), the Ninth Circuit was probably correct on this point. See
infra notes 124-127 and accompanying text. See also Choper, The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 686
LAW § 14-8, at 1201 (1988).
(1979); L. TRmE, AMRIcAN CoNsrrruONA
64. California Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (1984).
65. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 698, rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
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prohibited the logging of some 26,000 acres of the Blue Creek Unit. 6
In otherwise upholding the findings and decision of the district
court, the court of appeals distinguished on factual grounds the
Supreme Court ruling in Bowen v. Roy. 67 In that case, an American
Indian plaintiff failed to prevent the government from assigning or
using a social security number for his daughter, even though his
objections were religiously based. In holding for the Indians, the court
of appeals ruled that, "logging and road building on public lands...
is not the kind of internal governmental practice that the Court found
6' 8
beyond free exercise attack in Roy."
The Secretary of Agriculture sought certiorari for the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in a controversy that extended beyond the scope of
the Indian peoples of Northern California. In the ten years preceding
Lyng's decision, numerous Native American claims to public land use
on free exercise grounds had been argued. 69 In those actions, the
circuit courts of appeals had been less than uniform in application of
the Sherbert-Yoder indirect burden/compelling interest doctrine. 70 In
an attempt to further clarify free exercise clause analysis, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
66. Id.
67. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
68. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688,
693 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
69. See e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.) (Before government
use may be restricted of federal lands, plaintiffs must show that religious practices
could not be performed at other sites.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Crow v.
Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.) (Government construction at campground on public
park lands does not unconstitutionally burden plaintiff's religion.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983); Inupiat Community v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska
1982) (Eskimos' claim to portions of offshore waters and islands on religious grounds
held too speculative by the district court.), aff'd 746 F.2d 570 (1984), cert. denied
106 S.Ct. 68 (1985); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980) (Plaintiffs
cannot bar public from access to sites of religious import; to the extent plaintiff
Indians' religious rights were burdened by flooding of sacred prayer seats, compelling
interest of multi-state water project was overriding.), cert. denied 452 U.S. 954 (1981);
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.) (Plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate the religious centrality or indispensability of the Little Tennessee
Valley to their religious practices.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
70. Compare Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) with Wilson v.
Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In Crow the court held that construction of a
parking lot at a site of religious importance to Lakota and Tsistsistas Tribes did not
burden the Indians' religion, whereas in Wilson the court determined that first
amendment rights were implicated by the Hopi Tribe's action, but Native Americans
must demonstrate that government land use would impede practices that could not
be performed at other locations.

429
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B. THE DECISION

Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area,
Government of its
however, those rights do not divest the
7'
land.
ITS
all,
after
is,
what
use
right to
-Justice

Sandra Day O'Connor

The Court began its analysis by conceding the respondents'
legitimate religious beliefs, 72 and recognizing the devastating effects
of the G-O Road's completion. 7 The first issue raised, as indeed with
any free exercise attack, was whether the road's interference with the
Indians' religion was of the magnitude to require an overriding
government interest. The Court refused to recognize this threshold
burden.74 Declining to distinguish its own decision in Bowen v. Roy, 75
the majority drew a distinction between coercive action, and the
incidental effects of internal government procedures.7 6 Respondents'
argument of the fundamental dissimilarity between public land management and the administration of a state AFDC program, which was
at issue in Roy, was rejected. 77 In both cases, the Court reasoned the
government activities in question would significantly impair claimant's
ability to live within the tenets of their particular faith. 7 However,
"[i]n neither case ... would the affected individuals be coerced by

the Government's action into violating their religious beliefs.

.

. .79

Yoder40

with
In reconciling Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
its opinion, the Court admitted that indirect burdens to the free
exercise of religion are subject to constitutional review. 8' However,
the Court held that showing of a compelling interest is not required
where incidental effects of governmental action do no more than
71. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1327 (1988) (emphasis in original).
72. Id. at 1324.

73. Id.
74. Id.

75. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
76. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1.325 (1988).
77. Id.

78. Id. at 1328.
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
81. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1326 (1988).
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make it more difficult for citizens to practice their faith.12 Illustrative
of the distinction, Justice O'Connor squarely faced the dissent's
"misread[ing]" ' 3 of the decision in Yoder. Nothing in Yoder she
wrote, reflects the contention that the impact of Wisconsin's school
attendance policy on Amish culture itself was unconstitutional." In
that decision rather, it was a state statute providing criminal penalty
for noncompliance that was struck down."5 Similarly, denial of appellant's unemployment benefits in Sherbert was compared to a fine
on religious belief.8 6 Because respondents were subject to no such
criminal penalty or indirect "fine," the G-O Road's dissection of
their sacred land did not act to prohibit the Indians' religion within
7
the meaning of the first amendment.
Added to the Court's analysis was the policy concern of public
land management on a national scale. A permanent injunction against
logging or road construction covering 17,000 acres of public land was
the result of the district court's decision. 8 Justice O'Connor noted,
"one need not look far beyond the present case to see why the analysis
in Roy, but not respondents' proposed extension of Sherbert,
offers a sound reading of the Constitution." 8' 9
Due to the Court's failure to ascertain an unconstitutional burden
upon the Indians' religion, no effort to balance the competing interests
82. Id."This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government
programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which
have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs,
require government to bring forward a compelling justification." Id.
83. Id.at 1329.
84. Id.
85. Id.

86. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1326 (1988).
87. Justice O'Connor wrote in Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326, "[t]he Government

does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that the ...

projects at issue in

this case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices."
Had the facts of Lyng been such that 'Indian" was replaced in the quotation above
with "Catholic," "Jewish," or "Protestant," one finds it difficult to believe the
Court would have reached the conclusion it did.
88. Id.

89. Id. The dissent attacked the majority's conclusion that the destruction of

a religion is not an unconstitutional burden, by characterizing Lyng's result as
"cruelly surreal." Id. at 1337 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court's policy concern
was, for Justice Brennan in dissent, the purest of rationales. He wrote, "[i]n the
final analysis the Court's refusal to recognize the constitutional dimension ol respon-

dents' injuries stems from its concern that acceptance of respondents' claim cotild
potentially strip the Government of its ability to manage and use vast tracts of federal
property." Id.
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of tribe and government can be elicited from the majority opinion.
By their own analysis, a compelling state interest was unnecessary.
That assessment was perhaps most disturbing to the dissent, which
argued for the approach of a "centrality" standard in such controversies. 90 Under that approach, once Native Americans demonstrate
that lands central to their beliefs are sufficiently threatened by government activity, an overriding interest is required to allow disparate
use of the property in question. The majority concluded however,
that for federal courts to even attempt to interpret what is "central"
to a given faith, "would require us to rule that some religious
adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs." 9'
Despite the district court's decision, respondents argued in the
alternative that AIRFA blocked the G-0 Road's completion through
free exercise rights as a matter of statutory law. 92 Quoting the Congressional Record as to the legislative intent of the announced federal
policy the Court disagreed 93 stating, "it is difficult to see how the
Government could have been more solicitous." ' 94 The majority determined that as a statement of policy only, AIRFA is without legal
significance, and that the bill does not "confer special religious rights
on Indians." 95 Hence the Forest Service's commissioning of a study
on the effects of the G-0 Road's completion was wholly in accord
with the resolution's purpose regardless of whether that report's final
recommendations were followed. 96
C.

A MANIFEST HOLDING

The Court's test for determining at what point religious interference becomes an undue burden on a claimant's free exercise right is
dispositive to the holding in Lyng.97 As such, it is inadequately
articulated by the Court for at least two reasons. First, the majority's
distinction between government activities which compel individuals to
act adversely to their beliefs, and those regulations which merely make
90. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1338 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1330 (1988).
92. Id. at 1328.
93. Id.
94. Id.

95. Id. (quoting the bill's sponsor, Representative Morris Udall, 124 CONG.
REc. (1978), at 21,444).
96. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1328 (1988).
97. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
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religious worship more difficult, 9s draws a very fine line indeed. In
Sherbert, the first case to hold indirect burdens on religion unconstitutional, the Court specifically noted the invalidity of South Carolina's
statute even though the appellant was not compelled to work Saturdays. 99 Moreover, the Court in Sherbert did not limit its analysis to
unemployment benefits when it broadly stated that if the effect of a
law is to impede religious worship, that law is unconstitutional.' °
Certainly, from the findings of the lower courts, the Indian respondents' observance of their faith as defined by their own tenets, would
be impeded by the G-O Road's completion.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Court's attempt to
reconcile Sherbert with its holding in Lyng evinces a cultural bias that
is at once apparent. The burden to Adell Sherbert's beliefs was the
denial of unemployment compensation checks for her refusal to work
Saturdays.' 0 Within a cash and credit based economy, arguably the
keystone of contemporary American society, denial of financial support one would otherwise qualify for is of course troublesome. The
Court in Lyng compared South Carolina's sanction against Mrs.
Sherbert as a "fine imposed on Sabbath worship."' 0 2 But to the
cultures of Native Americans, inextricably tied to the land, 03 a
monetary fine would seem far less burdensome than land use inconsistent with traditional religious practice. Yet for the majority in
Lyng, denial of twenty-two weeks of financial assistance can be
unconstitutional,'°0 whereas permanent infringement on a sacred "area
of worship which cannot be delineated from social, political, cultur[al], and other areas oil] Indian lifestyle[],"'' 05 is not.
98. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
99. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) ("[I]t is true that no
criminal sanctions directly compel appellant to work a six-day week. But this is only
the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry ....
).
100. Id. at 404. The Court stated: "For '[ilf the purpose or effect of a law is
to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously
between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect."' Id. (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 607 (1961)).
101. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
102. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1326 (1988).
103. Id. at 1331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 418 (1963).
105. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1331 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing American Indian

Religious Freedom, Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 before the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 86 (1978) [statement of Barney Old Coyote,
Crow Tribe]).
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The obvious problem is in constitutionally equating specific religious use of public property with eligibility for public unemployment
benefits. The majority's reasoning that the Six Rivers National Forest
is after all the government's own land,1°6 cannot pass muster. If that
were so, South Carolina might well have argued in 1963 that whatever
rights Mrs. Sherbert may have to the unemployment benefits, however, those rights do not divest the state of its right to manage what
is, after all, its unemployment program. Beyond considering the denial
of unemployment benefits to be a criminal fine, which as already
noted the analysis of Sherbert did not require, 07 Lyng's opinion does
not explain how both public land use and receipt of government
benefits consistent with religious belief, are distinguishable.
Furthermore, reliance of the Court in Lyng on its decision in
Bowen v. Roy'08 raises more questions than it resolves. To understand
Roy, separate issues presented there must be examined. Stephen Roy
objected to two provisions required by Congress of a state AFDC
program. 1°9 That the state's plan provide as a condition of eligibility
that the applicant furnish his social security number, and also that
"such State agency shall utilize such account numbers ... in the
administration of such plan." 110 A highly divided court held the free
exercise clause did not allow an exemption for Roy."'
For Lyng, the precedential value of Roy is only with respect to
the second issue addressed by that case; whether Roy could prevent
the government's use of a social security number for its own internal
administrative purposes. Writing for the Court and deciding that Roy
could not, Chief Justice Burger quoted AIRFA. "That Resolutionwith its emphasis on protecting the freedom to believe, express, and
exercise a religion-accurately identifies the mission of the Free
Exercise Clause itself.""' 2 Lyng expressly rejected this very contention
when it held the "freedom to worship through ceremonials and

106. See supra text accompanying note 71.
107. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
108. 476 U.S. 693 (1978).
109. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1978).
110. Id. (emphasis in original).
111. Id. at 701-02 (the opinion included three partial concurrences, a partial
dissent and a dissent). Although most of the Court's confusion focused on the
assignment of a social security number for Roy's daughter Little Bird of the Snow,
Justice White wrote succinctly, "[b]eing of the view that . . . Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), control[s] this case, I cannot join the Court's opinion and judgment."
Id. at 733 (White, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 700.
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traditional rites" espoused by AIRFAI 3 was less a guarantee of
fundamental rights, than a policy position with which the Forest
Service had complied. As a result, that portion of Roy's analysis
contradicts the holding in Lyng, and vice versa. What both cases do
share, is the proposition that the first amendment does not affirmatively require that government conduct provide for the exercise of
114
native religious belief.
It appears the only reasoning that could have been advanced to
block the Indians' challenge was put forth by the majority in Lyng.
Had an unconstitutional burden on tribal religious rights been determined by the High Court, it would have been difficult to discern any
overriding government interest.
The district court's findings had concluded that completion of
the G-O Road's Chimney Rock section would not improve access to
timber resources in the area, "5 nor enhance employment in the region's
logging industry. 116 Recreational access to the Blue Creek Unit was
already adequately served," 7 and the roadway would improve neither
administration of the Six Rivers National Forest nor fire protection
abilities. I"' Further, those already completed unconnected sections of
the road served independent purposes," 9 and the court concluded that
120
prior federal investment alone did not justify the road's completion.
It is also important to remember that, of the Blue Creek Unit's 31,100
acres of currently roadless area,' 2 ' 26,000 acres have been denied to
113. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
114. In all fairness to Justice O'Connor's opinion, she suggests (citing J.
Madison, THE FEDERALIST Noi 10), that Lyng is a case the Court should not have
been forced to decide. She wrote:

[Tihe Constitution does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the
various competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere

religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours. That
task, to the extent that it is feasible, is for the legislatures and other

institutions.

Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at- 1327. See infra note 140.
115. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
5 6, 596 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub
nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
116. Id. at 595.96.
117. Id.at 596.
118. Id.
119. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
586, 596 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub
nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 590.
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commercial activity, such as logging, by the California Wilderness
Act of 1984.122 In light of these findings, even if a compelling interest
had been found, the least restrictive means test called for by Sherbert
and Yoder would have suggested alternative routes for the road's
completion.
Although the government could have argued that rerouting the
G-O Road solely because of respondents' religious objections would
violate the principles of the establishment clause, it is unlikely this
position could be taken seriously. Indeed, the court of appeals sum123
marily rejected this argument.
The Supreme Court directly faced such a confliction of clauses
however, in its 1978 decision in McDaniel v. Paty. 24 In that case, a
Tennessee minister was disqualified from serving as a delegate to the
state constitutional convention because of his religious affiliation, and
he brought suit invoking his first amendment right to free exercise.
The state countered that its compelling interest in separating the clergy
from public office on the basis of the establishment clause, overrode
the appellant's rights. 25 The Court held McDaniel's free exercise
rights preeminent.' 26 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan
noted that "the limits of permissible governmental action with respect
to religion under the Establishment Clause must reflect an appropriate
accommodation of our heritage as a religious people whose freedom
1 27
to ... practice[s] is protected by the Free Exercise Clause.'

122. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688,
698 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
123. Id. at 694.
124. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).

125. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978). "Tennessee asserts that its
interest in preventing the establishment of a state religion is consistent with the
Establishment Clause and thus of the highest order." Id.
126. Id. at 629.
127. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). See
also Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). In that case, public funding for the
support of American Indians under the Treaty of 1868 was contested when members
of the Sioux Tribe used federal trust dollars to pay education expenses at Catholic
schools. The Court wrote:
[W]e cannot concede the proposition that Indians cannot be allowed to use
their own money to educate their children in the schools of their own choice
because the Government is necessarily undenominational, as it cannot make
any law respecting an establishment of religion. ...
[I]t seems inconceivable that Congress should have intended to prohibit
them from receiving religious education .. .; such an intent would be one
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A DESTINED RESULT

Aside from the finding that Lyng's decision will "virtually destroy
the plaintiff Indians' ability to practice their religion,' ' 2 what does
its holding tell us? Where does Lyng fit in the rubric of constitutional
law, and what today ate the guidelines of first amendment free exercise
clause analysis? 2 9 A number of recent Court rulings may help to
answer these questions.

Two Supreme Court decisions reaffirm the narrow holding of
Sherbert. In both Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,'30 and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission of Florida,' claims for government benefits under unemployment compensation schemes were upheld. Yet the strict scrutiny standard applying the least restrictive means test of Sherbert and
Yoder, has gone no farther than the limited factual settings of those
landmark cases.
Invoking the decision in Yoder, an Amish employer contested
social security taxes in United States v. Lee.'32 In Lee, the appellee
withheld taxes from his Amish employees because both payment and
receipt of benefits under the insurance program violated Amish religious tradition. The Supreme Court found mandatory participation in
the social security system to be a burden on Lee's religious practice.
However, the Court held that the government's interest in the nationwide security network overrode appellee's rights.' 3 Yet nowhere in
the Court's brief opinion was any meaningful analysis of possible
least restrictive means enforcement of the taxation statute. In fact,
Justice Stevens' concurrence pointed out that the decision's reasoning

to 'prohibit the free exercise of religion' amongst the Indians....
Quick Bear, 210 U.S. at 81-82 (recognizing the potential clash of first amendment
clauses and suggesting that the free exercise of religion should control).
128. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688,
693 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nor. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988).
129. For analysis of recent Supreme Court free exercise holdings, see generally
Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY
147 (1987); Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv.
299 (1986).
130. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (petitioner who left work at armaments plant for
religious reasons retained right to unemployment proceeds.)
131. 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (Florida's denial of unemployment benefits to SeventhDay Adventist discharged for refusal to work Saturdays held unconstitutional.)
132. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
133. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
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"supports the adoption of a different constitutional standard
than
13 4
the Court purports to apply.'
In Bowen v. Roy, the primary support for the Court's ruling in
Lyng, Chief Justice Burger's separate opinion announced that any
reasonablemeans of achieving a compelling government interest subordinates free exercise rights.135 Additional evidence of the Court's
flight from strict scrutiny in free exercise controversies is demonstrated
by the judgment in Jensen v. Quaring. 36 In that case, a Nebraska
motor vehicle statute was struck down by an equally divided tourt.11
Alarming in its implications, is that half of the sitting Justices
concluded that the state's requirement of photographs on driver's
licenses served some compelling state interest. To those members of
the Court, the least restrictive means test should have suggested
selective exemptions for those with religious objections.
Finally, in Goldman v. Weinberger," the Supreme Court reviewed military dress requirements challenged under first amendment
guarantees. Petitioner, a commissioned Air Force Officer and an
ordained rabbi, was prohibited from wearing a yarmulke while on
duty in uniform. The Court deemed no compelling interest necessary
when military regulations are at issue. It held, "the First Amendment
does not require the military to accommodate such practices. . .. ,,3
When viewed in the light of these cases, the result in Lyng, if not its
reasoning, is more understandable.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Overturning the decision of California's Northern District Court
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that road construction across sacred American Indian
lands within the boundaries of a public wilderness area, is not a
cognizable free exercise claim.
Somewhere along the path of constitutional inquiry, something
has gone terribly amiss.
The first amendment's free exercise clause was designed to protect
our most cherished of democratic liberties. No citation is required to
remind us that our nation ultimately arose from the scourge of
134. Id. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986).
136. 472 U.S. 478 (1985).

137. Jenson v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985). See Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d
1121 (8th Cir. 1984).
138. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
139. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986).
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religious persecution. To better guard this fundamental right for all
Americans, the Supreme Court fashioned a standard of strict review
over those government actions found to interfere with the right of
religious practice. In the absence of a compelling interest to override
infringements on faith, be those burdens outright or indirect, the
Court has struck down prohibitive legislation it has encountered.
Yet today, the very culture of three Native American tribes is
threatened because of the logical distinction between coercive effects,
and incidental results. Due to that distinction, respondents simply
were not burdened. As a consequence, site specific practices older
than the document the Court interprets must give way to the construction of a road found to be superfluous. 140
When a rule of law, albeit of constitutional stature, produces
absurd results, perhaps it is time to reevaluate that rule. If the Supreme
Court deems it necessary on policy grounds-and constitutional-to
remove public land management from the doctrine of strict review
where religious exercise is the challenge, it should do so. It is within
its purview. But to deny a first amendment burden on religion exists
where three distinct peoples are so adversely affected, is to question
at once both the Court's analysis and credibility.

BILL PETERS

140. Congress may yet provide for future controversies that which the Court in
Lyng did not. Senators Cranston, DeConcini, and Inouye introduced a bill in the
100th Congress in support of Native American worship. S. 2250 Reads, "[E]xcept in
cases involving compelling governmental interests of the highest order, Federal lands
that have been historically indispensable to a traditional American Indian religion
shall not be managed in a manner that would seriously impair or interfere with the
exercise or practice of such traditional American Indian religion." S. 2250, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
Hearings began on S. 2250 in May of 1988. As of the date of this writing the
bill was pending in committee.
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